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Incurvati, Luca
On the concept of ﬁnitism
Synthese 192 (2015), no. 8, 24132436
03A05 (03F30)
In this paper, the author argues that the concept of ﬁnitism may be explicated in several
ways since it involves two diﬀerent ideas, namely: (1) that the ﬁnitary is epistemologi-
cally distinguished from the inﬁnitary by being graspable by indubitable intuition, and
(2) that it is ontologically or semantically more secure than the inﬁnitary the existence
of which is doubtful. Three explications of the concept of ﬁnitism are investigated, one
due to Charles Parsons, who elaborates the epistemological tenet of ﬁnitism. The other
two develop ideas inherent in the work of William Tait. One of them works out the onto-
logical tenet of ﬁnitism whereas the othercalled Cartesian ﬁnitism by Incurvati is
based on epistemological considerations. Incurvati argues that the parts of mathematics
respectively justiﬁable by the three explications of the notion of ﬁnitism are by no means
co-extensive.
The variety of ﬁnitism which has been developed by Charles Parsons since 1980 (cf.,
e.g., the collection MR2381345) relies upon a certain interpretation of Hilbert's views
concerning the distinguished role of mathematical intuition. This interpretation develops
the Kantian traits of Hilbert's view by declaring mathematical statements as justiﬁed
from a ﬁnitary point of view if they can be known intuitively, where intuition is un-
derstood as the grasp of abstract entities by means of concrete objects presented by
perception or imagination. Thus, for instance, perception or imagination of the token ||||
may provide the intuition of the abstract type of strings consisting of four items. Here the
abstract type is intuited because the concrete token is seen as such a string. Intuitions of
this kind may provide us with mathematical knowledge since they concern items which
belong to a structure isomorphic to that of the natural numbers (p. 2415). If, then, we
follow Parsons by restricting the ﬁnitary part of mathematics to statements justiﬁable
by intuitions of the kind described, ﬁnitary mathematics becomes a proper part of PRA
(primitive recursive arithmetic) since the deﬁnitional procedure of introducing functions
by means of primitive recursion cannot, as Parsons admits, be seen to be legitimate by
means of such intuitions only. Incurvati puts forward two objections against this concep-
tion of ﬁnitism. First he argues that making the intuition of abstract objects dependent
upon the perception of concrete tokens leads up to a dilemma. Either the abstract math-
ematical objects inherit the vagueness of their concrete counterparts, which is intolerable
for Parsons (p. 2417). Or grasping abstract objects by identifying concrete tokens as
their realizations may become conceptually so involved that one hardly can speak of an
immediate act of intuition any more (p. 2418), whereasaccording to both Hilbert
and Parsonssuch an immediacy is constitutive for acts of intuition (p. 2415). The sec-
ond objection raised by Incurvati is that the realm of the ﬁnitary is even narrower than
assumed by Parsons since the successor function, as characterized within PRA, cannot be
seen intuitively well-deﬁned. Parsons attempts to justify its well-deﬁnedness by showing
that we have intuitive knowledge of the string analogue of the statement saying that
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every number has a successor which is a number again. Incurvati, however, argues (pp.
24192422) that there is no legitimate way in the foundational framework admitted by
Parsons to prove such a general statement. He concludes that Parsons' conception of
ﬁnitism will not sanction any substantial part of mathematics unless the intimate con-
nection between intuition of abstract types and perception of concrete tokens is weakened
(p. 2422).
The second variant of ﬁnitism dealt with by Incurvati is characterized by the tenet
that ﬁnitistic theories do not appeal to the actual inﬁnite, i.e., to the existence of com-
pleted inﬁnite totalities. The views advocated by William Tait (cf., e.g., the collection
MR2119996) are taken as paradigmatic for this understanding of ﬁnitism. Incurvati
points out (p. 2425) that diﬀerent things can be understood by a theory's appeal to the
existence of inﬁnite collection: (a) the theory entails a statement asserting the existence
of such a collection; (b) the variables of the theory can only be interpreted as ranging
over such a collection; or (c) the theory can only be understood by means of inﬁnitary
concepts. According to Tait's Thesis (p. 2424) precisely the primitive recursive func-
tions are ﬁnitistic. This provides PRA with the distinguished status of being that system
which formalizes the ﬁnitist understanding of number. On the other hand, Tait does not
consider the notion of a ﬁnitistic function itself to be ﬁnitistic. From this, Incurvati con-
cludes (p. 2427) that Tait's ﬁnitism is of variety (c). The question, then, arises howon
such presuppositionsone can distinguish between PRA and PA (Peano arithmetic) on
the basic of the distinction between the ﬁnite and the inﬁnite. As PRA, PA too does
not entail a statement asserting the existence of some inﬁnite object. Furthermore, it
is controversial whether the understanding of PA really requires the grasp of inﬁnitary
concepts. Generality in PRA is expressed in a purely schematic way by means of free
variables; hence it does not require the existence of any inﬁnite totality (of numerals or
number terms). Given the derivability of statements of the form ∀x.F (x)∨∃x.¬F (x), the
interpretation of the quantiﬁers of PA, in contrast, seems to require the existence of such
a totality. But this is a distinction whichthough it can drawn within a (b)-variety of
ﬁnitism is not available in Tait's ﬁnitism of the (c)-kind, at least not without further
assumptions.
The last variety of ﬁnitism, Cartesian ﬁnitism (p. 2428ﬀ), transfers Descartes' episte-
mological strategy for ﬁnding a secure basis for all knowledge by eliminating everything
doubtful to mathematics. The ﬁnitary legitimate, then, is the absolute minimum neces-
sary for numerical reasoning: doubting this last foundation would mean to doubt numeri-
cal reasoning in general and would thus lead up to a radical skepticism which the ﬁnitist
need not address (p. 2430). Some remarks made by Tait point into the direction of
Cartesian ﬁnitisim. Since Tait, furthermore, conceives of PRA as the ﬁnitary legitimate
part of mathematics, he has to defend the thesis that this system of arithmetic is the
minimum necessary for a satisfactory body of numerical reasoning. Consequently, Tait
rejects more restrictive subsystems of PRA such as EA, which characterizes the so-called
(Kalmar) elementary functions, as ad hoc. In EA, deﬁnition by primitive recursion is
restricted by the requirement that the function to be deﬁned should not grow faster than
previously deﬁned functions; cf. MR0020529, MR0021918. According to Tait, such
requirements restricts iteration in an arbitrary way. Iteration, however, is constitutive for
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our notion of a number. Tait's idea seems to be, as Incurvati (p. 2431) points out, that
there can be no genuine numerical reasoning without unrestricted iteration. Incurvati
criticizes that an argument supporting this position is wanting in the relevant writings of
Tait. However, a prima facie argument for it may be constructed from some explanations
provided by Tait. But, as is shown by Incurvati, that argument suﬀers from an ambiguity
of the expression ﬁnite sequence entering into it in a crucial way. Two diﬀerent meanings
of that expression are compatible with Tait's explanation but each of them renders one of
the reconstructed argument's premises false and thus the entire argument non-conclusive
(p. 2432).
In the conclusion of his article, Incurvati quotes a passage from the second volume
of Hilbert and Bernays' Grundlagen der Mathematik (MR0272596) where the authors
explain that their term ﬁnitistic is not sharply deﬁned but rather denotes a methodical
guideline for distinguishing between certain kinds of concept-formations. He declares this
to be in accordance with his article which shows the concept of ﬁnitism to be informal
and amenable to diﬀerent explications. However, Incurvati's article leaves us with a much
darker view of ﬁnitismat least as regards the three variants of it which he considers
than this conciliatory remark suggests. Parson's ﬁnitism is found to be not even able to
establish the well-deﬁnedness of the successor function. Tait's ﬁrst explication of ﬁnitism
is criticized for failing to distinguish between PRA and PA as regards the avoidance of
inﬁnite totalities. Finally, Cartesian ﬁnitismaccording to Incurvati is not able to
explain why PRA should be preferred to the more restrictive EA.
Reviewed by Klaus Robering
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